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Abstract. In collective adaptive systems (CAS), adaptation can be im-
plemented by optimization wrt. utility. Agents in a CAS may be self-
interested, while their utilities may depend on other agents’ choices. In-
dependent optimization of agent utilities may yield poor individual and
global reward due to locally interfering individual preferences. Joint op-
timization may scale poorly, and is impossible if agents cannot expose
their preferences due to privacy or security issues.
In this paper, we study utility sharing for mitigating this issue. Sharing
utility with others may incentivize individuals to consider choices that are
locally suboptimal but increase global reward. We illustrate our approach
with a utility sharing variant of distributed cross entropy optimization.
Empirical results show that utility sharing increases expected individual
and global payoff in comparison to optimization without utility sharing.
We also investigate the effect of greedy defectors in a CAS of sharing,
self-interested agents. We observe that defection increases the mean ex-
pected individual payoff at the expense of sharing individuals’ payoff. We
empirically show that the choice between defection and sharing yields a
fundamental dilemma for self-interested agents in a CAS.
1 Introduction
In collective adaptive systems (CAS), adaptation can be implemented by opti-
mization wrt. utility, e.g. using multi-agent reinforcement learning or distributed
statistical planning [1,2,3,4,5]. Agents in a CAS may be self-interested, while
their utilities may depend on other agents’ choices. This kind of situation arises
frequently when agents are competing for scarce resources. Independent opti-
mization of each agent’s utility may yield poor individual and global payoff due
to locally interfering individual preferences in the course of optimization [6,7].
Joint optimization may scale poorly, and is impossible if agents do not want to
expose their preferences due to privacy or security issues [8].
A minimal example of such a situation is the coin game [9] (cf. Figure 1.
Here, a yellow and a blue agent compete for coins. The coins are also colored in
yellow or blue. Both agents can decide whether to pick up the coin or not. If both
agents opt to pick up the coin, one of them receives it uniformly at random. If
an agent picks up a coin of its own color, it receives a reward of 2. If it picks up
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a differently colored coin, it gets a reward of one. Each agent wants to maximize
its individual reward. If agents act purely self-interested, then each agent tries
to pick up each coin, resulting in suboptimal global reward. However, if rewards
can be shared among agents, then agents will only pick up coins of their own
color. They receive a share that is high enough to compensate for not picking
up differently colored coins. This increases individual and global reward alike.
There are many examples for this kind of situation. For example, energy
production in the smart grid can be modeled in terms of a CAS of self-interested
agents. Each participant has to decide locally how much energy to produce. Each
agent wants to maximize its individual payoff by selling energy to consumers in
the grid. However, the price is depending on global production. Also, global
overproduction is penalized. Routing of vehicles poses similar problems. Each
vehicle wants to reach its destination in a minimal amount of time. However,
roads are a constrained resource, and for a globally optimal solution, only a
fraction of vehicles should opt for the shortest route. In both scenarios, the
ability of agents to share payoff may increase individual and global reward alike.
+1 +2
E = 0.5 E = 1
+1
+2
E = 1 E = 1
Fig. 1. Two agents competing for a coin: if agent 1 (yellow) on the left side happens
to get the coin it will get a reward of +1 whereas agent 2 (blue) will get a reward of
+2 for it. If there is a fifty-fifty chance for an agent to get the coin when both agents
are trying to collect it, the expected values are 0.5 for agent 1 and 1 for agent 2 when
both agents independently optimize their utility. In contrast, if there is the possibility
to share reward then agents could learn to do the following: agent 1 (yellow) resists to
collect the coin. That increases the blue agent’s probability for getting a reward to 1.
The blue agent transfers reward (e.g. 1) to the yellow agent. This leaves agents with
expected values of 1 each and therefore defines a strong Pareto improvement compared
to the former outcome.
In this paper, we study distributed optimization with utility sharing for miti-
gating the issue of contrasting individual goals at the cost of expected individual
and global reward. To illustrate our ideas, we propose a utility sharing variant of
distributed cross entropy optimization. Empirical results show that utility shar-
ing increases expected individual and global payoff in comparison to optimization
without utility sharing.
We then investigate the effect of defectors participating in a CAS of sharing,
self-interested agents. We observe that defection increases the mean expected in-
dividual payoff at the expense of sharing individuals’ payoff. We empirically show
that the choice between defection and sharing yields a fundamental dilemma for
self-interested agents in a CAS.
The paper makes the following contributions.
– We motivate utility sharing as a means to mitigate conflicts and increase
expected individual and global reward in CAS of self-interested agents.
– We propose distributed optimization with sharing (DOS) as an algorithm to
realize utility sharing in self-interested CAS.
– We evaluate DOS empirically, showing that it increases individual and global
reward in expectation.
– We investigate the effect of defecting, non-sharing individuals in a group of
self-interested sharing agents. We show that the choice between defection
and cooperation yields a fundamental dilemma for self-interested agents in
collective adaptive systems.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss
related work. We introduce DOS in Section 3. We discuss our empirical results
and the Sharer’s Dilemma in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Related Work
In general, we see our work in the context of collective adaptive systems (CAS)
[2,3] and multi-agent systems [10]. In particular, we are interested in CAS where
agents are adaptive through optimization of actions of policies wrt. a given in-
dividual or global utility function. These settings can for example be modeled
in terms of distributed constrained optimization problems [11], or as stochastic
games [12].
Searching for optimal actions or learning policies can be done by open- or
closed-loop planning, potentially enhanced with learned components such as
search exploration policies or value functions [5,13,14,15,16]. Another approach
for learning optimal policies in multi agent domains such as CAS is multi agent
reinforcement learning (MARL) [1,17] and its modern variants based on deep
learning for scaling up to more complex domains[4,18,19]. A recent example
of planning-based deep MARL combines open-loop search and learned value
functions in fully cooperative multi-agent domains [5].
In the case of self-interested agents, the Coco-Q algorithm was proposed [20].
Coco-Q has been evaluated for discrete two-player matrix games, and requires
explicit knowledge of other agents’ utilities. In some sense, our study of sharing
in CAS extends the Coco-Q approach to continuous optimization with more
than two agents. Also, we model the amount sharing as a free parameter to be
learned in the course of optimization.
In the context of a research on emergent social effects in MARL [6,7,21,9], a
recent report investigated the effects of inequity aversion and utility sharing in
temporally extended dilemmas [22]. The authors state that ”it remains to be seen
whether emergent inequity-aversion can be obtained by evolving reinforcement
learning agents” [22]. Our current work is a first step into this direction, and
shows that the question of whether to share or not poses a dilemma in and
for itself, at least in the case of stateless optimization (in contrast to learning
policies).
3 Distributed Optimization with Sharing
We model decision making in a CAS as a stochastic game (X,N,A, p,R) [12].
– X is a finite set of states.
– N = {0, ..., n} is a finite set of agents.
– A = ×i∈NAi is a set of joint actions. Ai is a finite set of actions for agent i.
– p(x′|x, a) is a distribution modeling the probability that executing action
a ∈ A in state x ∈ X yields state x′ ∈ X.
– R = {ri}i∈N , ri : X×A→ R is a set of reward functions, one for each agent.
In the following, we assume X = {x} consists of a single state, and ∀a ∈ A :
p(x|x, a) = 1. As x is unique, we will not consider it in further notation.
We assume that ri is available to agent i in terms of a generative model that
may be queried for samples a, e.g. a simulation of the application domain. Each
agent only has access to its own reward function, but does not know the reward
functions of other agents.
The task of a self-interested agent i is to find an action that maximizes its
payoff. However, its payoff ri(a), a ∈ A in general depends on the choices of
other agents. One way to deal with this dependency is to perform optimization
jointly for all agents, that is maxa∈A :
∑
i∈N ri(a). However, in a CAS with
self-interested agents, each participant tries to maximize its individual reward.
Also, in many situations participating agents would not want to expose their
individual reward functions to others due to privacy or security issues [8]. In
these situations, joint optimization wrt. global reward is not feasible. Note that
optimization of self-interested individuals is non-stationary due to changes in
others’ choices as they optimize for themselves.
3.1 Reward Sharing
We define agents’ utilities as ui. We consider the two different cases we are
interested in:
1. Individual, purely self-interested optimization
2. Self-interested optimization with the option to share individual rewards
Pure Self-Interest When optimizing independently and purely self-interested,
ui(a) = ri(a).
Sharing Sharing agents choose a share si ∈ R, si ≥ 0 additionally to ai. We
denote the joint shares by s = ×i∈Nsi. Given n agents, a joint action a ∈ A and
a joint share s ∈ Rn, si ≥ 0 for all i, we define individual agents’ utility ui for
distributed optimization with sharing as follows. 3
ui(a, s) = ri(a)− si +
∑
j,j 6=i sj
n− 1 (1)
Shares are uniformly distributed among all other agents. There are no bilat-
eral shares. Note that this sharing mechanism is an arbitrary choice.
For example, sharing yields the following utilities for two agents.
u0(a, s) = r0(a)− s0 + s1
u1(a, s) = r1(a)− s1 + s0
3.2 Distributed Optimization with Sharing
We now give a general formulation of distributed optimization with sharing
(DOS). DOS is shown in Algorithm 1. Each agent maintains a policy pii(ai),
i.e. a distribution over actions and shares. It is initialized with an arbitrary
prior distribution. A rational agent wants to optimize its policy such that the
expectation of reward is maximized: maxEari(a), where a ∼ ×i∈Npii(ai). Note
that optimization of an individual’s policy depends on the policies of all other
agents. Also note that policy optimization of self-interested individuals is non-
stationary due to changes in others’ policies as they optimize for themselves.
After initialization, DOS performs the following steps for a predefined number
of iterations.
1. Each agent samples a multiset of nsample actions from its policy and com-
municates it to other agents.
2. A list of joint actions is constructed from the communicated action lists of
other agents.
3. The utility of each joint action is determined according to Equation 1.
4. The policy is updated in a way that increases the likelihood of sampling
high-utility actions and shares.
After niter iterations, each agent samples an action and a share from its
policy, executes the action, and shares reward accordingly. The resulting joint
action yields the global result of DOS.
3.3 Cross-Entropy DOS
In general, DOS is parametric w.r.t. modeling and updating of policies pii. As
an example, we instantiate DOS with cross entropy optimization [23]. We label
this instantiation CE-DOS.
3 We can account for the change of signature of ui by extending the action space Ai
of each agent accordingly: As,i = Ai × R, As = ×i∈NAs,i.
Algorithm 1 Distributed Optimization with Sharing (DOS)
1: initialize pii for each agent i
2: for niter iterations do
3: for each agent i do
4: each agent samples a list of nsample actions from pii
5: broadcast sampled actions
6: for each agent i do
7: build joint actions a
8: determine utility ui(a) according to Eq. 1
9: update pii to increase the likelihood of high-utility samples
10: for each agent i do
11: execute ai and share si(a) sampled from pii
For CE-DOS, we model a policy pi as isotropic normal distribution N (µ, σ).
I.e., each parameter of an action is sampled from a normal distribution that
is independent from other action parameter distributions. Note that it is also
possible to model policies in terms of normal distribution with full covariance,
but the simpler and computationally less expensive isotropic representation suf-
fices for our illustrative concerns. As prior CE-DOS requires initial mean µ0 and
standard deviation σ0 for a policy (cf. Algorithm 2, line 1). I.e. initial actions
before any optimization are sampled as follows.
ai ∼ N (µ0, σ0) (2)
Updating a policy (cf. Algorithm 1, line 12 - 15) is done by recalculating
mean and variance of the normal distribution. We want the update to increase
the expected sample utility. For each of niter iterations, we sample nsample actions
and shares ai, si ∼ pii from each agent’s policy, and build the corresponding joint
actions a = ×i∈Nai and shares s = ×i∈Nsi.
Each agent evaluates sampled actions and shares according to its utility
ui(a, s). From the set of evaluated samples of each agent, we drop a fraction
ψ ∈ (0, 1] of samples from the set wrt. their utilities. That is, we only keep high
utility samples in the set. We then compute mean and variance of the action pa-
rameters in the reduced set, and use them to update the policy. A learning rate
α ∈ (0, 1] determines the impact of the new mean and variance on the existing
distribution parameters: E.g. let µt and σt be the mean and standard deviation
of a normal distribution modeling a policy at iteration t, then
µt+1 = (1− α)µt + αµnew
σt+1 = (1− α)σt + ασnew
where µnew and σnew are mean and standard deviation of the elite samples. We
require a lower bound σmin on the standard deviation of policies in order to
maintain a minimum amount of exploration.
The hyperparameters of CE-DOS are thus as follows.
– A stochastic game (X,N,A, p,R)
– Number of iterations niter
– Number of samples nsample from the policy at each iteration
– Prior mean µ0 and standard deviation σ0 for policies
– Lower bound σmin on the policy standard deviations
– Fraction ψ ∈ (0, 1] of elite samples to keep
– Learning rate α ∈ (0, 1]
Algorithm 2 Cross Entropy DOS
1: Intitialize pii ← N (µ0, σ0) for each agent i
2: for niter iterations do
3: for each agent i do
4: sample nsample actions and shares ai, si ∼ pii
5: clip si such that si ≥ 0
6: broadcast sampled actions and shares
7: for each agent i do
8: build joint actions a = ×i∈Nai and shares s = ×i∈Nsi
9: determine utility ui(a, s) according to Eq. 1
10: keep ψ · nsample elite samples a, s with highest utility
11: compute µnew and σnew from ai, si in the elite samples
12: µt+1 ← (1− α)µt + αµnew
13: σt+1 ← (1− α)σt + ασnew
14: σt+1 ← max(σt+1, σmin)
15: pii ← N (µt+1, σt+1)
16: for each agent i do
17: ai, si ∼ pii
18: execute ai and share si
4 Experimental Results and the Sharer’s Dilemma
We experimentally analyzed the effects of sharing in collective adaptive systems
of self-interested agents.
4.1 Domains
We evaluated the effect of sharing utilities with CE-DOS in two synthetic do-
mains. In these domains, a CAS of self-interested agents has to balance individual
and global resource consumption (or production, respectively).
For example, the energy market in the smart grid can be modeled as a CAS of
self-interested agents. Each participant has to decide locally how much energy to
produce. Each agent wants to maximize its individual payoff by selling energy to
consumers in the grid. Therefore, each agent would like to maximize its individual
energy production. However, the selling price per unit is typically non-linearly
depending on global production. For example, global overproduction is penalized.
There are a number of corresponding real world problems, for example en-
ergy production and consumption in the smart grid, traffic routing, passenger
distribution to individual ride hailing participants, cargo distribution on trans-
port as a service, routing of packets in networks, distribution of computational
load to computers in a cluster, and many more.
We now define two market models (simple and logistic) as domains for eval-
uating the effects of sharing in CAS of self-interested agents.
Simple Market We model individual and global production, and use their
relation for calculating utilities in such a scenario. We set Ai = R1 as individual
agents’ action space, ai ∈ Ai models the production amount. The sum
∑
i∈N ai
models the global production.
We define the reward of each agent as the relation of its own individual
resource consumption to the global resource consumption. I.e. the reward cor-
relates to an agents market share. We introduce a slope parameter ξ to control
the utility slope of individual and global consumption.
ri(a) =
ai(∑
j∈N aj
)ξ (3)
In this setup, a rational agent would like to increase its own consumption
until saturation. I.e. a monopoly is able to produce cheaper than two small
producers, and therefore an inequal production amount unlocks more global
reward. If all agents act rationally by maximizing their individual ai, in general
the corresponding equilibrium is not equal to the global optimum.
Logistic Market We modeled another market scenario for investigating the
effects of sharing in CAS of self-interested agents. As before, each agent has
to choose the amount of energy to use for production of a particular good. I.e.
Ai ∈ [.1, 4], as in the simple market domain. Note that this is an arbitrary choice.
Each agent has a logistic production curve pi : Ai → [0, 1] as a function
of its invested energy. For example, this models different production machine
properties. The logistic curve pi is given as follows.
pi(ai) =
1
1 + e−c(ai−o)
(4)
Here, c ∈ R defines the steepness of the logistic function, and o ∈ R determines
the offset on the x-axis.
Global production prod is the sum of individual production
∑
i pi(ai). A price
function (i.e. an inverse logistic function) defines the price per produced unit,
given global production prod .
price(prod) = 1− 1
1 + e−c(prod−o)
(5)
The reward for an agent is defined as the product of its produced units and
the global price.
ri(a) = pi(ai) · price(prod) where prod =
∑
j∈N
pj(aj) (6)
Figure 2 shows an example of production and price functions in the logistic
market domain.
Fig. 2. Example production functions (left) and global price function (right) in the
logistic market domain.
4.2 Setup
For our experiments, we used the following setup of CE-DOS.4
– We consider a stochastic game with n agents, that is N = {1, ..., n}.
– We set n = 10, n = 50 and n = 100 in our experiments.
– Individual action spaces were set as Ai = [.1, 4].
– We define the individual reward functions as given by Equation 3.
– We set the number of iterations niter for CE-DOS to 100.
– We draw nsample = 100 samples from the policy per iteration for each agent.
– Prior mean µ0 and standard deviation σ0 were set to 0 and 1, respectively.
– We set the fraction of elite samples ψ = 0.25.
– We set the learning rate α = 0.5.
– We set the minimal policy standard deviation σmin = 0.2.
We sampled domain parameters uniformely from the following intervals.
– We sampled the slope parameter ξ from [2, 4] in the simple market domain.
– We sampled logistic steepness c and offset o from [1, 3] for all production
and cost functions in our experiments with the logistic market domain.
4 We plan to publish our code upon publication.
We varied the number of sharing agents to measure the effect of defecting
(i.e. non-sharing) agents that participate in the stochastic game together with
sharing individuals.
Note that for the results we report here, we clipped the sharing values such
that agents are only able to share up to their current reward, i.e. si ≤ ri(a) for a
given a ∈ A. In general, other setups with unbound sharing are possible as well.
4.3 Effect of Sharing on Global Reward
Figure 3 shows the mean global utility gathered for varying numbers of shar-
ing agents. We can observe that the fraction of sharing agents correlates with
global utility. We also see that the effect of sharing increases with the number
of participating agents.
Figure 4 shows the mean individual shared value for the corresponding ex-
perimental setups. We can see that the amount of shared value correlates with
global reward. I.e. the more value shared, the higher the global reward. We also
see that the number of participating agents correlates with the effect of sharing.
4.4 Sharer’s Dilemma
Figure 5 shows the Schelling diagrams for the corresponding experiments. A
Schelling diagram compares the mean individual utility of sharers and defectors
based on the global number of sharing agents [24]. We can see that agents that
choose to defect gather more individual utility than the sharing ones.
The shape of the Schelling diagrams in Figure 5 shows that sharing in col-
lective adaptive systems with self-interested agents yields a dilemma in our ex-
perimental setups.
Should an individual agent share or defect?
There is no rational answer to this question for an individual self-interested
agent. If the agent chooses to share, it may be exploited by other agents that
are defecting. However, if the agent chooses to defect, it may hurt its individual
return by doing so in comparison to having chosen to share.
Note that the amount of sharing is a free parameter to be optimized by DOS.
This means that all behavior we observe in our experiments is emergent. The
combination of available resources, interdependency of agents’ actions and the
ability to share lets agents decide to share with others based on their intrinsic
motivation.
Our results illustrate a potential reason for emergence of cooperation and
inequity aversion in CAS of only self-interested agents. They also give an ex-
planation to the existence of punishment of individuals that exploit societal
cooperation at the cost of sharing individuals’ and global reward.
5 Conclusion
We summarize the ideas in this paper, discuss limitations and implications of
our results, and outline venues for further research.
Fig. 3. Global utility gathered for varying numbers of sharing agents in the simple
market (left column) and logistic market (right column) domains. 10 agents (top row),
50 agents (center row) and 100 agents (bottom row) in total. Solid line shows empirical
mean of 10 experimental runs, shaded areas show .95 confidence intervals. Best viewed
on screen in color.
Fig. 4. Mean individual shares for varying numbers of sharing agents in the simple
market (left column) and logistic market (right column) domains. 10 agents (top row),
50 agents (center row) and 100 agents (bottom row) in total. Solid line shows empirical
mean of 10 experimental runs, shaded areas show .95 confidence intervals. Best viewed
on screen in color.
Fig. 5. Schelling diagrams showing mean individual utility for defectors and sharers,
for varying numbers of sharing agents in the simple market (left column) and logistic
market (right column) domains. Note the log scale on the y-axis. 10 agents (top row),
50 agents (center row) and 100 agents (bottom row) in total. 10 experimental runs.
Best viewed on screen in color.
5.1 Summary
In collective adaptive systems (CAS), adaptation can be implemented by opti-
mization wrt. utility. Agents in a CAS may be self-interested, while their utilities
may depend on other agents’ choices. Independent optimization of each agent’s
utility may yield poor individual and global payoff due to locally interfering in-
dividual preferences in the course of optimization. Joint optimization may scale
poorly, and is impossible if agents do not want to expose their preferences due
to privacy or security issues.
In this paper, we studied distributed optimization with sharing for mitigat-
ing this issue. Sharing utility with others may incentivize individuals to consider
choices that are locally suboptimal but increase global reward. To illustrate our
ideas, we proposed a utility sharing variant of distributed cross entropy optimiza-
tion. Empirical results show that utility sharing increases expected individual
and global payoff in comparison to optimization without utility sharing.
We also investigated the effect of defectors participating in a CAS of shar-
ing, self-interested agents. We observed that defection increases the mean ex-
pected individual payoff at the expense of sharing individuals’ payoff. We empir-
ically showed that the choice between defection and sharing yields a fundamental
dilemma for self-interested agents in a CAS.
5.2 Limitations
A central limitation of CE-DOS is its state- and memoryless optimization. In
our formulation of utility sharing self-interested agents optimize an individual
action and share that maximizes their utility. However, our formulation does not
account for learning decision policies based on a current state and other learning
agents. In this case, the utility of each agent would also depend on concrete
states, transition dynamics and potentially also on models agents learn about
other participants [25,26].
As there is no temporal component to the optimization problems that we
studied in this paper, it is also not possible to study the effect of gathering
wealth in our current setup. We think that the dynamics of sharing in temporally
extended decision problems may differ from the ones in stateless optimization.
For example, corresponding observations have been made for game theoretic
dillemas, where optimal strategies change when repeating a game (in contrast to
the optimal strategy when the game is only played once) [27]. Similar research
has been conducted in the field of reinforcement learning, however not accounting
for utility sharing so far [6].
We also want to point out that exposing shares eventually provides ground
for attack for malicious agents [8]. Albeit indirectly, exposed shares carry in-
formation about individual utility landscapes, allowing attackers to potentially
gather sensitive information about agents’ internal motivations. Agents in criti-
cal application domains should consider this weakness when opting to share.
5.3 Future Work
In future work, we would like to transfer our approach to temporally extended
domains and model sharing in CAS with multi-agent reinforcement learning.
Hopefully, this would enable studying sharing and the Sharer’s Dilemma in more
complex domains.
We also think that there are many interesting options for realizing sharing
besides equal distribution as formulated in Eq. 1. For example, our formulation
does not allow for bilateral shares or formation of coalitions. Also, we would be
interested to study the effect of wealth on emergent cooperation and defection.
Another interesting line would be to investigate the effects of punishment in
CAS of self-interested agents.
As an application domain, it would be interesting to exploit the duality of
planning and verification. For example, agents utility could model individual
goal satisfaction probability. Sharing could be used to increase individual and
global goal satisfaction probability in CAS.
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